Introducing the Communist

On October 4, 1939, Mao Zedong wrote a speech for the Party journal Communist, an inner-party journal led and supported by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Included in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 2.

After the Anti-Japanese War entered the stalemate stage, the power of the Communist Party of China developed rapidly, however, a large number of new Party members had not yet received a systematical education of Marxist theories, and many newly established Party organizations were not solidified stable, under such conditions, in order to strengthen the Party’s leadership, and " build up "a bolshevized Communist Party of China, a party which is national on scale and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally, and in order to mobilize the masses to overcome the dangers of capitulation, split, and retrogression within the Anti-Japanese National United Front, Mao Zedong proposed to create this inner-party publication, i.e., the Communist.

First of all, he systematically reviewed and summarized the 18-year history of the Party since its founding, and proposed the idea: we should " build up a bolshevized Communist Party of China, a party which is national on scale and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally" and this as a “glorious and momentous task” and a "great undertaking".

Then, he summed up from the Party's 18 years of historical experience in one sentence: the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the three fundamental questions of our Party in the Chinese revolution.

Having a correct grasp of these three questions and their interrelations is tantamount to giving correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution.

From this he came to the conclusion: "the united front, armed struggle and Party building are the Communist Party of China's three "magic weapons", its three principal magic weapons for defeating the enemy in the Chinese revolution. This is a great achievement of the Communist Party of China and of the Chinese revolution."

Thirdly, Mao Zedong made an in-depth analysis of the three magic weapons and their interrelationships, in connection with the historical experience of the Communist Party of China in leading the revolutionary struggle.

By reviewing the experience of the Chinese proletariat, i.e., allying with the national bourgeoisie and other classes in various stages of revolution, and carrying out the united front alliance with the big bourgeoisie during the Anti-Japanese War, he pointed out: we can clearly see that if our Party did not know that it would ally with the bourgeoisie in a certain period of time, it would not be able to advance and the Chinese revolution would not develop.

However, while allying with the bourgeoisie, the Party should treat this relation correctly; when the Party takes a correct political line on the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or of breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward. If our Party breaks up the alliance when forced to do so, it must resolutely carry out armed struggle against the bourgeoisie, so as to protect the interests of the Party and ensure that the revolution will not frustrate.

Mao Zedong said: united front, as one important component of the political line of the Communist Party of China is the policy both of unity with the bourgeoisie and of struggle against it. The development and tempering of the Party through its unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie, i.e., the united front policy, are an important component of Party building. When discussing the relationship between the development of the Party and the armed struggle, Mao Zedong pointed out: armed struggle in China, in essence, is a peasant war and the Party's relations with the peasantry and its close relations with the peasant war are one and the same thing.

He argued: In the past eighteen years the Communist Party of China has gradually learned to wage armed struggle and has persisted in it. We have learned that without armed struggle neither the proletariat, nor the people, nor the Communist Party would have any standing at all in China and that it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. In these years the development, consolidation and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolutionary wars; without armed struggle the Communist Party would assuredly not be what it is today. Comrades throughout the Party must never forget this experience for which we have paid in blood. The building of such a party is imperative for the victory of the Chinese revolution and on the whole the subjective and objective conditions for it are present; indeed, this great undertaking is now in progress. The “preface” emphasized that the process of the Party's maturity is a process in which the whole Party gradually learned integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of Chinese revolution.

Mao Zedong finally wrote: “Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. That is how the three are related to each other.” “Introducing The Communist” fully demonstrated Mao Zedong's principle of combining the basic principles of Marxism with the reality of the Chinese revolution, and gave a scientific summary of the historical experience of and profoundly revealed the objective law of the development of Chinese revolution, armed the whole Party politically, ideologically and theoretically, thus guided Chinese Revolution to victory.