George Kennan (1904-2005)

American diplomat and historian. Born on February 16, 1904 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to a farmer family. He studied history at Princeton University from 1921 to 1925. In 1926, he began his diplomatic career and became a professional diplomat. Since 1928, he served as the deputy consul of the United States in Berlin, in 1935 as consul and second secretary in Austria, and in 1944-1946 as the Chargé d'affaires director in the Embassy of the United States in Soviet Union.

On February 22, 1946, Kennan sent a long secret message to the Washington government, that is, “The Telegram No. 511”, with the header: “The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State”, which deeply analyzed the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union and put forward a long-term strategy to deal with the Soviet Union.

He mainly put forward the following countermeasures: Firstly, to develop a strong military power to deter the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union would not dare to act rashly, because if its opponents have enough power and clearly demonstrate this power, it would be often the time for the Soviet Union to retreat. Secondly, we should strengthen publicity to the public so that they can understand the truth of the Soviet Union’s problems, so as to liberate them from the panic of ignorance. Thirdly, he suggested that USA should strengthen social and national cohesion and maintain the vitality of the American society. “Every policy that can solve our own social problems, every courageous and firm move that can enhance the self-confidence, discipline, morale and collective spirit of our own people, will be a diplomatic victory against the Soviet Union.” Fourthly, the United States should become the leader of the world and lead other countries to a more constructive world. Although the telegram did not put forward the word “containment”, it clearly regarded the Soviet Union as an opponent and enemy, emphasized the importance of combining military and non-military methods, and expressed the idea of containing the development and infiltration of Soviet communism. The telegram was appreciated by some senior officials of the U.S. Government, which changed Kennan’s fate from an unknown diplomat to an influential figure in the decision-making circle of the state.

In 1947, Kennan became the first Director of The Policy Planning Office of the State Department and participated in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. The “Marshall Plan” for the revival of Western Europe, the policy towards Japan, the “wedge strategy” which aimed to divide the Soviet led camp, which was carried out by the U.S. Government in the early postwar period, were inseparable from Kennan and his Policy Planning Office. He published an article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in July 1947 Foreign Affairs Quarterly. In this article he proposed that the United States should use “counter-force” to “contain the expansionist tendency of the Soviet Union for a long time, patiently, firmly and vigilantly”. Buna çinceden bak

In this article, Kennan argued that a firm containment strategy should be carried out from three levels: the first level is to control the influence of the Soviet Union within the scope of its control after the end of World War II; the second level is to reduce the Soviet Union control upon its sphere of influence, especially on the Eastern European countries, which should aim to disintegrate the socialist camp; the third level is to carry out peaceful evolution and ideological transformation of the Soviet Union from within.

The first level is immediate, while the second and third levels are long-term tasks. Since it was published the article was echoed with great attention. The “containment” strategy against the Soviet Union put forward in this auricle is generally regarded as the ideological basis of the U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union. From then on to the end of the Cold War, the U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union, and even the whole strategy, was called the “containment strategy”, and Kennan himself was also named the “father of containment” strategy.

During the Korean War in 1951, G.F. Kennan, who had returned to his alma mater Princeton University for research work, was invited by Secretary of State Acheson to go out of the mountains. He held two secret meetings with Soviet ambassador to the United Nations in New York and reached a consensus of principles on holding the Korean Armistice negotiations. Since then, Kennan served as the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia from 1952 to 1953 and 1961 to 1963.

In academia, Kennan established his position as a diplomatic historian. He wrote 17 academic works, two of which won Pulitzer Prize, published a lot of articles in famous academic journals, and lectured in famous universities such as Harvard University and Oxford University. Kennan died in Princeton, New Jersey, on March 17, 2005.