Intuition

Perceptual knowledge gained through direct contact with objective things. The word “intuition” has different meanings in the history of philosophy. It is intueri in Latin, meaning gaze. In Chinese, the word means “intuition” or “instinct” under different contexts, and the literal meaning is direct observation. In Kantianism, intuition has two specific meanings: First, it refers to the perception or impression caused by the “thing-in-itself” on “self”. Kant called it “phenomenon” or “empirical intuition” and argued that it was posteriori, acquired perceptual knowledge, i.e., empirical intuition. Second, it refers to the pure form of “thing-in-itself” existing in the “self” before it acts on the “self”, i.e., time and space, which Kant calls “priori intuition” or “pure intuition”. He argued that this intuition is inherent, does not rely on experience, and makes “empirical intuition” possible basis or premise.

Hegel analysed the one-sidedness and subjectivity of Kant’s thought of intuition, and elevated Kant’s subjective idealism to the height of objective idealism. He pointed out that Kant, although admitting the objectivity of the concept, still regarded “concept” as a subjective thing and argued sensation and intuition as the premise of understanding, while phenomenology of spirit argued that intuition goes through the perceptual consciousness stage first, and then rise to the understanding level through the perceptual stage. Hegel stressed that the concept should be regarded as not a conscious intellectual activity or subjective intellectuality, but a self-made thing-in-itself, which constitutes a natural and spiritual stage. Hegel revealed Kant’s vacillation between empiricism (=materialism) and idealism, Hegel himself arguing wholly and exclusively from the standpoint of a more consistent idealism.

Feuerbach condemned Kant for not recognizing the reality of the thing-in-itself as objective reality. Kant argued that the thing-in-itself is simple thought, “the essence of imagination”, rather than “the essence of reality”, or the concrete, existing essence. Kant, who vacillated between idealism and materialism, inevitably left materialism. However, Feuerbach, who criticized Kant from the perspective of materialism, only understood the object, reality and sensuousness from an intuitive perspective, ignoring the subjective initiative of human beings and thus moving towards metaphysical materialism.

In his Theses on Feuerbach, Marx criticized all materialism in the past, including the defects of Feuerbach’s metaphysical materialism of leaving social practice of human beings and understanding things by perception passively and intuitively, and clarified that practice is the basis of knowledge. He pointed out that “the main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the Object, actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation (intuition), but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.” Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wanted sensuous contemplation (intuition), but he did not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity. The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society. The old materialism regarded man as a passive receiver, regarded man’s cognitive activities as mirror-like perceptual intuition, and regards man’s relationship with the objective world as only the relationship between reflecting and being reflected, instead of transforming and being transformed, thus severing the relationship between understanding and transforming the world. Therefore, intuitive metaphysical materialism can neither correctly understand human nature nor correctly understand the nature of society.

Lenin thoroughly studied and then sublated the arguments of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, etc. On intuition, and inherited and developed the scientific thought of Marx and Engels on intuition.

In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin discussed the standpoint and function of intuition in cognition from the perspective of dialectical materialism. He pointed out that all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely. From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, such is the dialectical path of cognition of truth, of cognition of objective reality.

The scientific interpretation of intuitive concepts made by the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge is helpful for people to overcome Feuerbach’s negative and passive reflection theory of metaphysical materialism and give full play to people’s subjective initiative. It is conducive to overcoming Kant’s transcendentalism’s “pure intuition” and preventing subjectivism and empiricism. It is of great theoretical significance to overcome Hegel’s objective idealist intuitive thought of self-made thing-in-itself, to rise to the level of abstract thinking through intuitive perception in practice, to grasp the essence of things through phenomena, and to resist formalism and bureaucracy.