On the United Front

Speech by Zhou Enlai at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China on April 30, 1945. It was included in the Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Part I) in 1980 published by the People’s Press.

The whole speech is divided into two parts: one is about the questions of the Anti-Japanese National United Front; the other is about the experience of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the lessons drawn from it.

The main contents are as follows:

(1) Systematically reviewing and summarizing the persistent differences in principle and intense struggle between the KMT and the Communist Party on the questions of national resistance to Japan and democracy, arguing that the period from the Incident of September 18 to the present can be divided into five stages.

In the first stage, from the Incident of September 18 to the Xi'an Incident, the centre of disagreement was whether to resist Japanese aggression; in the second stage, from the Xi'an Incident to the July 7th Incident, the center of disagreement was whether there was to be real preparation for armed resistance or merely empty talk; and in the third stage, from the Incident of July 7 to the withdrawal from Wuhan, the center of disagreement was whether there should be total or partial armed resistance to Japan; the fourth stage is from the Fifth Plenary Session of the KMT Central Executive Committee in 1939 to the open negotiations between the KMT and the Communist Party when the Political Council was in session in 1944, the center of disagreement was whether there should be compromise, split and retrogression or resistance, unity and progress; and in the last stage, from our proposal of the slogan of the coalition government to the present, the center of disagreement was whether to establish a democratic coalition government or continue a one-party dictatorship.

(2) Summarizing the experience of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the lessons drawn from it and pointing out that the New-Democratic United Front is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal United Front of the masses led by the proletariat.

Mao Zedong made it clear that in order to establish a United Front to consolidate new democracy, we must recognize clearly the three problems of the enemy, our ranks and the commanding officers. In the course of the revolution, owing to frequent changes in the relations between the enemy and ourselves and in the conflicting camps as well as to constant change in the over-all situation, the problems of the United Front have been very complicated. We should study the lessons of the United Front in the light of these three aspects pointed out by Mao Zedong.

(A) The enemies of the New-Democratic Revolution are imperialism and feudalism. This fact has remained unchanged throughout the period of the revolution. But there is more than one imperialist country in the world, and in China there are cliques and groups within the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. They are often at odds with each other, so the enemy camp keeps changing. People representing each class were themselves changing. Throughout China's New-Democratic Revolution, there have been big changes in the imperialist and feudal forces, especially during the War of Resistance.

(B) In terms of ranks, our Anti-Japanese National United Front includes the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie and a portion of the big bourgeoisie.

There are three categories of people in these ranks: the progressive forces, made up of the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie; the middle forces, or intermediate strata; and the die-hard or reactionary forces, that is, the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The regional power groups are somewhere near the middle—or between the middle and the die-hard forces. In their class character they resemble the reactionaries, but in their opposition to Chiang Kai-shek they perform the same function as the middle forces.

On the basis of this analysis, we have drawn up the policy of developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating, splitting and attacking the die-hards. This is the policy of uniting with the many, opposing the few and striking at the worst die-hards.

(C) The proletariat, being more progressive than the other classes, should lead the others and be what Comrade Mao Zedong calls "the commanding officer". But the proletariat doesn't gain the position of command automatically. The proletariat and the Communist Party must win leadership through struggle, because others are contending for leadership as well—not only the big bourgeoisie but also the liberal bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Each wants the united front to be led according to its own ideas. But the main force contending with us for leadership is the KMT, the ruling group representing the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

Therefore, it is mainly the KMT and the Communist Party which struggle with each other for leadership of the united front, both of them trying to win over the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie. The methods adopted by each side to win people and to lead them are different. The KMT resorts to oppression. Our method is to co-operate with everyone we can win over. It is necessary to sum up the historical experience and prevent the Right-leaning mistakes and “Left” mistakes made in the struggle for leadership. The problem of leadership is, therefore, the central problem of the United Front. The Right deviationists waive leadership, while the “Left” isolates itself, becoming "a commander without an army". The Right deviationists give away the whole army, while the “Left” deviationists push it away.

This statement by Zhou Enlai summarized a number of important lessons from the analysis of historical events and class relations on the relations between the Communist Party and the United Front, and played an important role in guiding the Party to adhere to the correct approach of the United Front.