Talk with Students of the Sun Yat-sen University

On May 13, 1927, Stalin talked with Chinese students studying in the Sun Yat-sen University about the Chinese Revolution. In 1927, it was compiled as a book titled as the “Revolution in China and the Mistakes of the Opposition”. The Chinese translation is included in Vol. 9 of the Complete Works of Stalin.

The news of Chiang Kai Shek’s counter revolutionary coup in 1927 caused great disturbance and reaction among Chinese students studying at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. On May 13, 1927, Stalin visited to Sun Yat-sen University to have a discussion with the students, and answered ten written questions raised by the students, focusing on the character of the Chinese revolution, the character of the Kuomintang, the peasant revolution and the leadership of the proletariat in the Chinese revolution.

On the character of the Chinese revolution. Stalin pointed out that the peasant war in China’s rural areas was not so much against the feudal survivals as against the wrong judgment of the bourgeoisie. He pointed out that if there were no feudal survivals in China, there would be no soil for an agrarian revolution. At the same time, he argued that there was merchant capital in China’s rural areas and the primitive accumulation by this merchant capital is uniquely combined with the rule of the feudal class in the countryside. In China, the predominating power in this medieval situation was the power of feudal survivals, the power of the landlords and of the land-owning bureaucracy, military and non-military, in a peculiar combination with the power of merchant capital, and these peculiar conditions that create the soil for the peasant agrarian movement which is growing in China.

On the class character of the Kuomintang. Stalin refuted Radek’s erroneous assertion that the Kuomintang was a petty-bourgeois party, pointing out that the Comintern used to and now considers it as a party of a bloc of several oppressed classes, that have their own party organizations. The Kuomintang is not a petty-bourgeois party, but a party in opposition with imperialism. Radek’s error, and that of the opposition faction generally, was that they disregarded the semi-colonial status of China, failed to observe the anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution, and does not observe that the progressive faction of the Kuomintang in Wuhan, i.e., the Kuomintang without the Right wing Kuomintangists, is the center of the struggle of the Chinese laboring masses against imperialism.

On the class composition of the Kuomintang Party. In the “Resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Comintern in December 1926 in respect to the status of Kuomintang”, it was pointed out that the Kuomintang was a bloc of four classes, including the big bourgeoisie, and Stalin argued: The Comintern resolution speaks not of the big bourgeoisie in general, but of "part of the capitalist bourgeoisie." Consequently, what is referred to here is not every kind of big bourgeoisie, but the national bourgeoisie of the non-comprador type. Stalin said: “In May 1925, I spoke of the Kuomintang as the Party of a bloc of the workers and peasants, which intended to describe the actual state of affairs in the Kuomintang.” Stalin added: "What I said did not preclude, but on the contrary, presumes the fact that actually Kuomintang is, for the time being, the party of a bloc of the workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie.” “If there emerges a dictatorship of the proletariat, but also if Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies are formed … The latter case will mean the creation of a dual power. It means a struggle for power between the Kuomintang and the Soviets. The formation of workers' and peasants' Soviets is a preparation for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution, to the socialist revolution.”

About the transition from the democratic dictatorship to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin refuted the erroneous view of Martynov who argued that the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat in China could be possible without a “second” revolution.

Firstly, the revolutionary Wuhan government was not yet a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Secondly, it would be impossible for China to make a peaceful transition from a bourgeois democratic revolution to a proletarian revolution since the enemies of the Chinese revolution were too strong; Stalin added “also the state organization form of the Kuomintang was unsuitable for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution; Stalin added: A peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution should be considered out of the question in China, Lenin sought a peaceful transition but after the July 1917 defeat Lenin recognized that a peaceful transition to the proletarian revolution had to be considered out of question.

About why Wuhan government was attacking the counterrevolutionary army of warlord Zhang Zuolin (Mukdenists), but doesn’t attack the rightist Chang Kai-shek. Stalin pointed out that the Wuhan government attacked Zhang Zuolin’s army for at least two reasons: Firstly, because Zhang Zuolin was leading his troops towards Wuhan and aimed to annihilate the revolutionary forces there, consequently attacking this army of Zhang Zuolin was an absolutely urgent measure of defense; secondly, the revolutionary Wuhan faction wanted to join forces with Feng Yuxiang’s troops and to advance further in order to broaden the base of the revolution, which, again, is a matter of the greatest military and political importance for the revolutionary Wuhan faction at that moment.

About the possibility of a Kemalist revolution in China. Stalin pointed out that a Kemalist revolution would be impossible in China. Firstly, a Kemalist revolution wasa revolution of the top stratum, a revolution of the national merchant bourgeoisie, the revolution erupted in the struggle against the foreign imperialists and whose subsequent development was essentially directed against the peasants and workers, against the very possibility of an agrarian revolution. Secondly, a Kemalist revolution is impossible in China for two reasons: Firstly, there is in China a certain minimum of militant and active industrial proletariat, which enjoys enormous prestige among the peasants; secondly, in China there a developed agrarian revolution which in its advance is sweeping away the survivals of feudalism.

About the agrarian-peasant revolution. Stalin pointed out that only with the slogan of the confiscation of the land and active support of the vast masses of the peasants and workers, feudalism and imperialism can be overthrown in China, therein lies the strength and might of the Chinese revolution.Stalin also made predictions on the situation of the Chinese revolution. It is a mistake to regard Chiang Kai-shek’s coup as the decline of the Chinese revolution, a revolution always moves in zigzags, and Chiang Kai-shek’s coup has in fact led to the Kuomintang being cleansed of dross and to the core of the Kuomintang moving to the Left, and “in point of fact, with Chiang Kai-shek’s coup, the revolution as a whole has entered a higher phase of development, the phase of an agrarian movement.”

On the issue of the immediate formation of Soviets of workers’ and peasants’ deputies in China, and the hegemony of the proletariat and the Communist Party in China. Stalin pointed out that the formation at the present time of Soviets of workers’ and peasants’ deputies in the area of action of the Wuhan government means the creation of organs of revolt against the Wuhan government, which would be incorrect and inadmissible. The Soviets will have to be formed at the time of the transition from the agrarian revolution, from the bourgeois-democratic revolution, to the proletarian revolution. Stalin criticized the opposition’s mistake in asking the Communist Party to withdraw from the Kuomintang and the Wuhan government, pointing out that the Communist Party could not withdraw from the Kuomintang, but ensure the leadership of the Communist Party both inside and outside the Kuomintang.

On the formation of a regular Red Army in China. Stalin pointed out that as a perspective this question should certainly be kept in mind, but, considered practically, it is impossible at this moment, to replace the present army by a new army, a Red Army, simply because there is so far nothing to replace it by. Therefore, on the one hand, it is necessary to improve and revolutionize the existing government army; on the other hand, it is necessary to lay the foundations for new, revolutionary regiments and divisions, composed of revolutionary peasants and workers, so as to develop into the nucleus of the new army which will subsequently develop into a Red Army.

About the seizure of the foreign factories in China. Stalin pointed out that the time is not yet ripe for passing to the seizure of the Chinese enterprises, and their nationalization is a matter for the future. The task now consists in fanning the flames of the agrarian revolution, in ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in this revolution, in strengthening Wuhan and converting it into a center of the Chinese revolution.

This speech covered a wide range of Chinese revolutionary issues, which had a great impact on the development of the Chinese revolution at that time, and some of the ideas expounded in this speech played a guiding role in the revolutionary struggle of colonial and semi colonial countries. However, Stalin did not fully understand Chiang Kai-Shek’s counter revolutionary coup and its harm to the Chinese revolution, and he had high expectations of the Wuhan government and had a certain impact on Zhang Zuolin’s right opportunism.