Definiteness and Indefiniteness of the Criterion of Practice

An important principle of dialectical materialist theory of knowledge.

The definiteness of criterion of practice means that the question of whether a person’s knowledge is true or not can only be tested by practice, the only one definite criterion. There is no other criteria besides practice, and practice will eventually prove the truth of knowledge. The indefiniteness of criterion of practice refers to that the testing of truth by practice is not achieved overnight or once and for all. Human practice is historical and conditional, so its testing of truth is also historical and concrete, and is thus relative and temporary. Only the sum-total of constantly developing human practices is the criterion to test the truth of knowledge. In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin pointed out that the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, brushing aside the endless fabrications of professorial scholasticism. Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely. This criterion also is sufficiently “indefinite” not to allow human knowledge to become “absolute”, but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism.”

Lenin inherited, defended and developed Marx and Engels’ argument on the criterion of practice. Practice’s testing of truth is an ongoing process. The definiteness and indefiniteness of the criterion of practice are closely related to the characteristics of practice, the process of human knowledge, and the concreteness and temporariness of truth, etc. Only by adhering to the dialectical unity of the definiteness and indefiniteness of the criterion of practice can we avoid seeing any knowledge as fixed, rigid and unchangeable, and avoid falling into the mire of idealism and absolutism while adhering to materialist epistemology.