Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front

Comrade Mao Zedong wrote this outline for the report he made at a meeting of the Party's senior cadres in Yan’an on March 11, 1940. Included in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 2. After the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, how to maintain, consolidate and develop the United Front, especially how to deal with the relationship between the United Front and its allies? After the stalemate stage of the Anti-Japanese War, the KMT’s Chiang Kai-shek clique gradually turned into a passive anti-Japanese and active anti-Communism and launched the first anti-Communist climax at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940. In response to these practical problems, Mao Zedong made this report.

The report makes an in-depth exposition from nine aspects. Especially with regard to the current political situation, the report points out that the Anti-Japanese War has entered a stage of strategic stalemate, but the enemy is still holding fast to his basic policy of subjugating China and is pursuing it by means such as damaging the Anti-Japanese United Front, intensifying the "mopping-up" campaign behind enemy lines and stepping up economic aggression.

In the anti-Japanese battlefield, the Communist Party fought against the Japanese invaders with almost equal strength compared to the KMT. The basic condition for victory in the Anti-Japanese War is the expansion and consolidation of the Anti-Japanese United Front.

The report points out that the tactics required for this purpose are to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and combat the die-hard forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle.

Developing the progressive forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, boldly expanding the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, establishing anti-Japanese democratic base areas on an extensive scale, building up Communist organizations throughout the country, developing national mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women and children, winning over the intellectuals in all parts of the country, and spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a struggle for democracy. Winning over the middle forces means winning over the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and the regional power groups. However, there are several principles which we must observe in our struggle against the die-hards in the period of the Anti-Japanese United Front.

Firstly, the principle of self-defense. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. Secondly, the principle of victory. We will not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. Third, the principle of a truce. In other words, the three principles are to fight "on just grounds", "to our advantage" and "with restraint".

The report also emphasizes that the KMT is a heterogeneous party which includes die-hard, middle elements and progressive elements; taken as a whole, it must not be equated with the die-hard force elements. In our struggle to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the die-hard forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals, whom the die-hards are doing their utmost to win over; therefore, it is an important and indeed an essential policy to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring them under the influence of the Party. Mao Zedong elaborated a set of strategic principles of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which played a guiding role in safeguarding the Anti-Japanese National United Front and winning the final victory of the Anti-Japanese War.